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The Bankruptcy Reform Process:
Maximizing Judicial Control in Wage Earners' Plans
Marjorie Girth*
Immediately after the 95th Congress convened in January 1977, a new
version of legislation designed to accomplish a major revision of the
Bankruptcy Act' was introduced in the House of Representatives. 2 This
version was based upon reactions to earlier legislative proposals and
suggestions submitted during extensive hearings held by the House
Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights
during the 94th Congress. 3 Senate action on bankruptcy legislation was
delayed by the implementation of an extensive committee reorganization
plan.4 As a result, the House legislation became the focus of attention for
all interested parties in the new Congress. After extensive subcommittee
markup sessions, the full Judiciary Committee overwhelmingly approved
the legislation for House action. 5
Discussions of earlier versions of the legislation had emphasized vary-
ing proposals for structuring the bankruptcy process. 6 The first recom-
mendation, known colloquially as the Brookings proposal, suggested that
*Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. A.B. 1959, Mt.
Holyoke; LL.B. 1962, Harvard. Professor Girth is a co-author of the Brookings Institution
study of bankruptcy administration. D. STANLEY AND M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM,
PROCESS, REFORM. Field research for this article was supported by a Baldy Summer
Research Fellowship, awarded pursuant to the terms of the Christopher Baldy Fund of the
State University of New York at Buffalo. The author is grateful for that support, as well as
for a sabbatical leave which enabled her to prepare this article. Her colleagues, Daniel F.
Gifford and John A. Spanogle, Jr., also provided very helpful comments on an earlier
version of this work. Bankruptcy Judge Beryl McGuire, Robert T. Cryan, and John W.
Creahan, the two Chapter XIII Trustees in Buffalo, and their staffs, allowed extensive
observation of their practices and responded to the many questions which field research
produces. Without their cooperation, this work would not have been possible. As always,
final responsibility is the author's.
I I U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1970).
2 H.R. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
3 Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess. (1975-1976) [hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Act Revision]. Rep. Don Edwards, who
chairs the subcommittee, had earlier served on the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States. See note 8 infra.
I The Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machin-
ery had also held extensive hearings during the 94th Congress. The Bankruptcy Reform Act:
Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machin-
ery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1975-1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as The Bankruptcy Reform Act]. Sen. Quentin Burdick, who had long chaired the
subcommittee, moved to the Appropriations Committee as part of the reorganization. Sen.
Dennis DeConcini was then appointed to chair the subcommittee, all of whose members
were also new appointees. Letter from Robert E. Feidler of the subcommittee staff to the
author (April 19, 1977).
5 The Judiciary Committee vote was 26-3. Wall St. J., July 20, 1977, at 2, col. 3. The
reported legislation was substituted for the earlier version and became H.R. 8200, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Consideration of the Senate version of the legislation, introduced on
October 31, 1977, is scheduled for 1978. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
6See Girth, Prospects for Structural Reform of the Bankruptcy System, 63 CALIF. L. REv.
1546 (1975).
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an administrative agency process bankruptcy cases.7 Such a structure
would require the services of administrative law judges but would not
continue the current bankruptcy courts. The Commission bill8 recom-
mended an administrative agency only for initial processing of all bank-
ruptcies, and proposed a new bankruptcy court to review agency deci-
sions and serve as the initial trial forum for specified issues.9
The present bankruptcy judges I0 wished to preserve their own status by
retaining the present decisionmaking structure. The Judges' Bill, I I drafted
by representatives of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges,
presented an alternative proposal which maximized judicial control over
the processing of bankruptcy cases. As a result, status politics' became
very important as the House legislation evolved. 12
This article examines the effort to maximize judicial control over the
bankruptcy process and its impact on H.R. 8200's procedural require-
ments for the nonbusiness bankruptcy option known currently as the
wage earners' plan.1 3 As background, it describes the present nonbusi-
D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 199-204 (1971).
8 H.R. 10792 and S. 2565, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reintroduced as H.R. 31 and S.
236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). This legislation resulted from the work of the Commission
on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, authorized by Congress in 1970. Kennedy,
Foreword: Bankruptcy Reform-1973, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 381-87 (1973).
9Girth, supra note 6, at 1546, 1547-49.
10 The referee in bankruptcy is usually the presiding officer, pursuant to § 22 of the
Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 45 (1970), and is to be called judge. RULES BANKR. PROC. Rule
901(7). [hereinafter cited as RULES]
11 H.R. 32 and S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
12 Status concerns and economic self-interest coincide in the present bankruptcy judges'
efforts. But status politics may also reflect self-defined perceptions of social worthiness, as
the legislative activities of the American temperance movement reveal. J.R. GUSFIELD,
SYMBOLIC CRUSADE (1963).
Another example of status politics in the bankruptcy reform process emerged in the effort
to extend the terms and change the appointment process for judges in the reformed system.
The Commission Bill and the Judges' Bill had agreed on a 15 year term for the new
judgeships, but they differed significantly on the method of judicial appointment. § 2-102(a)
and (b), H.R. 31 and 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The 15 year term appeared to increase
the status of present judges, whose appointments are for six years. However, the Commis-
sion Bill coupled the longer term with a Presidential appointment, requiring the advice and
consent of the Senate. Such a proposal threatened to shift the political setting for such
appointments away from the professional politics which dominate the present selection
process by the United States district judges. Bankruptcy Act § 34(a), II U.S.C. § 62(a)
(1970); D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 7, at 158-60. The judges' proposal attempted to
retain the judicial influence, recommending selection by the judicial council within each
circuit.
H.R. 8200 proposed the creation of United States Bankruptcy Courts for each judicial
district. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(a) (1977). Judges appointed by the President,
with the Senate's advice and consent, would serve during good behavior, i.e., for life,
except in rare cases of professional misconduct. The power over appointments would shift
to each state's Senators and away from the present district judges, who reportedly oppose
dilution of their status by the creation of new bankruptcy courts. Their concerns are
reflected by the U.S. Judicial Conference which has criticized the new system as "entirely
unnecessary." Wall St. J. May 16, 1977, at 2, col. 3. The strength of this reaction was
reflected in a 183-158 House vote on an amendment which rejected the proposed court
system. Wall St. J., October 31, 1977, at 8, col. 2. House rules permit the issue to be
reconsidered, and a later 262-146 vote approved the new court system. Wall St. J., February
2, 1978, at 8, col. 3.
13 Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act, §§ 601-686, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1068 (1970). The
comparable procedure in H.R. 8200 can be found at Chapter 13, H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st
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ness bankruptcy options and the statutory procedures for monitoring
confirmed wage earners' plans. Then, using illustrative samples from
three years of cases in the Buffalo region of the Western District of New
York, it assesses whether present plans are being administered in accord-
ance with the statutory formalities. The economic incentives which affect
creditors' behavior in taking advantage of their opportunities to monitor
these proceedings are also examined. The article describes the proce-
dures which were developed for such cases in the Bankruptcy Rules and
the legislative processes which produced H.R. 8200. Finally it assesses
the consequences if status politics produces procedures which do not
reflect accumulated experience.
I. PRESENT BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURES
A. Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Options
For at least fourteen years, nonbusiness or personal cases administered
under the Bankruptcy Act have constituted between eighty-five and
ninety percent of the total caseload. 14 The present statute provides two
basic options for nonbusiness debtors who cannot informally resolve
problems with their creditors. In one procedure, known as straight bank-
ruptcy, the debtor's nonexempt assets 15 are identified and converted into
cash for payment to creditors. Straight bankruptcy has the advantage of
providing the debtor with a discharge from all unsecured debts.18 Only on
very rare occasions does the debtor's prebankruptcy behavior givecred-
itors grounds for blocking the issuance of the discharge. 17 A debtor who
receives a discharge, however, cannot receive another unless the later
bankruptcy petition is filed more than six years after the petition pursuant
to which the discharge is granted.18
The other option is the Chapter XIII wage earners' plan, which focuses
on the debtor's income instead of on nonexempt assets. Wage earners'
plans have been used with widely varying frequency among the federal
court districts but have consistently constituted sixteen to eighteen per-
cent of the nonbusiness bankruptcy filings during fiscal years 1972-76. l9 A
Sess. §§ 1301-1331 (1977), providing for the "adjustment of debts of an individual with
regular income."
14 See, e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, TABLES OF
BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, Table F3 (1976) [hereinafter cited as TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY
STATISTICS,], for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976. See also earlier years. Business cases
constitute the remaining 10 to 15%. For details on the business bankruptcies, see D.
STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 7, at 107-17.
15 At the present time, the Bankruptcy Act allows the exempt status of assets to be
determined by state law. Bankruptcy Act, § 6, 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1970). These laws vary
greatly in their treatment of debtors, but their typical effect in nonbusiness cases is to make
very few nonexempt assets available for liquidation and payment to creditors. D. STANLEY
& M. GIRTH, supra note 8, at 81-84.
16 Straight bankruptcy has no effect on fully secured debt, because the creditor has the
option of liquidating its collateral if the debtor defaults. Bankruptcy Act, § 57(h), II U.S.C. §
93(h) (1970).
17 D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 7, at 90-91.
18 Bankruptcy Act, § 14(c)(5), I1 U.S.C. § 32(c)(5) (1970).
19 TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, supra note 14, at Tables F2 and F3.
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debtor who selects this option proposes to pay all or part of his or her
debts over an extended period of time. If creditors agree to the proposal,
the plan is confirmed by the bankruptcy judge and payments begin.20
A wage earners' plan may be an attractive option to debtors and their
creditors for a number of reasons. Many debtors wish to meet their
obligations and to avoid what they perceive to be the stigma of bank-
ruptcy.2 1 Nonbusiness debtors who reaffirm a substantial proportion of
their unsecured debts after receiving a straight bankruptcy discharge find
that the discharge is of limited value. 22 The wage earners' plan may
benefit unsecured creditors by producing more payments than if the
debtor had chosen straight bankruptcy 23 and by offering more equitable
treatment than if the creditor's claim had been among those not reaffirmed
aiter a straight bankruptcy proceeding. In addition, the straight bank-
ruptcy discharge remains available to a debtor who has fully paid all
creditors pursuant to a wage earners' plan, if financial problems recur.
After the court confirms a wage earners' plan, the present Bankruptcy
Act and Rules24 provide formal procedures for modifications. "Any party
in interest," usually the debtor, 25 may request a change in the amount of
payments or the time period for the plan. Upon receiving the request, the
court must give notice to interested parties and hold a hearing26 before
reaching a decision. If the court denies the request for modification and
the debtor is unable to meet the requirements of the confirmed plan,
several options are available. The debtor can request a discharge if three
years have elapsed and the failure to complete the plan is caused by
circumstances beyond his or her control.2 7 Creditors must be given the
opportunity to object to the discharge before it is granted by the court. If
the required three years have not elapsed, the court can dismiss the
proceeding or, with the debtor's consent, adjudicate him or her a bank-
rupt.28 Once a case is dismissed, creditors are free to pursue the debtor
for payment of the remaining amounts owing to them. A debtor in a wage
earners's proceeding may be adjudicated a bankrupt without his or her
consent if the petition was originally filed as a straight bankruptcy and
later converted to a wage earners' plan. If adjudication occurs,
nonexempt assets are liquidated and distribution is made pursuant to
20 For confirmation of a plan, Chapter XlII requires the consent of a majority in number
and amount of the unsecured creditors and of all secured creditors who are affected by the
plan. Bankruptcy Act, § 652(1), 11 U.S.C. § 1051(1) (1970). Allegedly secured claims must
therefore be examined very closely in the effort to devise feasible plans for such debtors. If
the secured status is not validly perfected or the value of the collateral is less than the
amount of the claim, it will be wholly or partially unsecured.
21 D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 7, at 65-69, 230-32.
22 H. JACOB, DEBTORS IN COURT 109-10 (1969); D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 7, at
59-62.
23 In at least 84% of the nonbusiness straight bankruptcies, unsecured creditors received
nothing; in the remaining cases, they received only seven cents on the dollar. D. STANLEY &
M. GIRTH, supra note 7, at 87, 93.
24 See Section II A, infra, for a discussion of the development of the Rules.
25 RULE 13-214(a), modifying Bankruptcy Act § 646(5), 11 U.S.C. § 1046(5) (1970).
26 Id.
27 Bankruptcy Act, § 661, 11 U.S.C. § 1061 (1970) and RULE 13-404(b).
28 RULE 13-215(a), modifying Bankruptcy Act §666, 11 U.S.C. § 1066 (1970).
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straight bankruptcy procedures. Dismissal or adjudication can be re-
quested either by the debtor or by any other interested party. 29
B. Case Study of Present Administration of Wage Earners' Plans
In order to compare the actual administration of wage earners' plans
with the statute's procedural requirements, a random sample was initially
drawn from Chapter XIII cases filed in fiscal year 1971 with the bank-
ruptcy judge in the Buffalo office of the Western District of New York.30
The results of an examination of these records can illustrate administra-
tive practices in the Buffalo area but may not represent the experience of
the nation as a whole. However, the Buffalo statistics are consistent with
information from seven diverse districts concerning two preliminary is-
sues: the financial profiles of the debtors3 1 and the importance of the
bankruptcy judge's receptivity to efforts to use wage earners' plans.3 2
The debtors' financial profiles may indicate their ability to complete a
confirmed plan without subsequent modifications. 33 The judge's attitude
affects not only the initial choice of the wage earners' plan but also his
reactions to problems arising in the debtor's performance under the plan.
29 Id.
30 This phase of the research was assisted by David Klein, J.D., 1972, State U. of N.Y. at
Buffalo, with the support of the Jaeckle-Abrams Fund for student assistance, Faculty of
Law and Jurisprudence, State U. of N.Y. at Buffalo. Officially reported data on such. cases
do not include the details of case administration which are crucial to this comparison, but are
limited to numbers of cases filed and closed, the amounts of creditors' claims, and the
amounts distributed.
11 D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 7, at 43; see also other studies cited therein.
32 D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 7, at 94-105.
11 In this study, blue collar workers with low incomes predominated:
Type of Employment Fiscal Year of Filinga
1971 1973 1975
Semiskilled or unskilled 55% 49% 40%
Craftsmen or skilledb 12.5% 24.4% 19%
Professionals or Semiprofessionalsc 10% 2% 14.2%
Sales 7.5% 2% 2.4%
Clerical 5% 14.2% 9.5%
Service 5% 6.1% 2.4%
Proprietors and Managers - 2.0% 4.8%
Others or Unknown 5% - 7.1%
a Forfiscal year 1971, N=40cases; forfiscal 1973, 49 cases; for fiscal 1975, 42 cases.
b Job descriptions in the files were often not precise. Doubts about the distinction
between the semiskilled and skilled categories were resolved in favor of classifying
the petitioner as skilled.
c Usually public employees, such as police or corrections officers, or deputy sheriffs.
For fiscal 1971, the median take-home pay was $6,250; for fiscal 1973, $6,750; and for fiscal
1975. $7,250. The petitioners were obviously heavily indebted at the time they filed:
Scheduled Indebtedness as Percent of Take-Home Pay
1971 1973 1975
Median ................................ 65% 65% 55%
Low .................................. 15% 15% 25%
High .................................. 200% 165% 185%
For fiscal 1971 and 1973, the median scheduled indebtedness was $4,250; for fiscal 1975,
$4,750.
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Wage earners' plans had rarely been used in the Buffalo area of the
Western District of New York when Judge Beryl McGuire was appointed
in April 1968. 34 After acquiring experience in administering nonbusiness
straight bankruptcy cases, Judge McGuire decided that wage earners'
plans should be more widely considered because of the repayment poten-
tial which they offered. He launched an educational effort aimed at the
practicing bar and at creditors, appointed a standing trustee for all such
cases, 35 and made arrangements to utilize a computerized service for
maintaining case records and handling disbursements. In combination,
these decisions resulted in a rapid increase in filing and disbursements to
creditors, as well as in accumulated cases pending at the end of succes-
sive fiscal years. 36
Fiscal year 197137 was chosen for the initial sample because it was the
first full year of experience with Judge McGuire's efforts to encourage the
wage earners' plan as a nonbusiness bankruptcy option and because the
Buffalo labor area experienced a sharp increase in unemployment shortly
thereafter. 3 Earlier research had supported a predictable relationship
between overall bankruptcy filings and the state of the economy.3 9 The
1971 sample was selected so that debtors' progress under difficult em-
ployment conditions could be monitored in order to allow more precise
analysis of the relationship between unemployment conditions and an
ability to complete wage earners' plans successfully. It was hypothesized
that unemployment would make completion of the wage earners' plans
34 Ten wage earners' plans were filed in fiscal 1965; 10 in fiscal 1966; 7 in fiscal 1967; 2 in
fiscal 1968; and 3 in fiscal 1969. Letter from the staff of Judge Beryl McGuire to the author
(November 10, 1976).
35 The first standing Chapter XIII trustee was appointed on November 25, 1969. When his
caseload became too great, a second standing trustee was added on October 1, 1974. These
appointments provided the court with in-house experts who could answer attorneys' and
creditors' inquiries, in addition to monitoring debtors' performance under their plans.
36 Annual reports filed by Judge McGuire and the Chapter XIII trustees with the Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts indicate that for fiscal years 1970-75, the respec-
tive data were as follows:
FY Cases Fileda Cases Pendinga  Disbursements to Creditors
1970 49 49 $ 54
1971 280 292 $ 101,117
1972 301 586 $ 351,823
1973 368 869 $ 643,754
1974 541 1386 $ 933,084
1975 1059 2072 $1,206,114
a Understates the number of individuals involved, because spouses' cases
were consolidated for purposes of administration.
3 When this research was conducted, the federal government's fiscal year ran from July 1
to June 30, with the fiscal year identified by its final month. Thus, cases for fiscal year 1971
were filed as early as July 1, 1970.
38 Unemployment in the area rose to an annual average of 9.3% in fiscal 1972 from 6.3% in
fiscal -1971. For fiscal 1973 and 1974, it declined to an annual average of 7.6% and 7.9%
respectively, before rising sharply again to 10.3% in fiscal 1975. Information provided by
George P. Smyntek, Senior Economist, New York State Department of Labor (June 24,
1976).
39 D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 7, at 27-28.
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difficult for the debtors, thereby causing either the debtor or creditors to
move to modify or terminate the plans. 40
The Bankruptcy Act contemplates a maximum of three years for per-
formance under wage earners' plans by allowing the debtor to seek a
discharge thereafter if the failure to complete the payments is due to
circumstances beyond his or her control. 4 1 The fiscal 1971 sample was
therefore reexamined in the summer of 1975. By that time all of the
sample cases had been filed at least four years earlier, 42 and, even allow-
ing for some delays, all might have been expected to be closed. Instead,
thirty percent of the sample cases were still open. The open cases faced a
median repayment period of six years, with the longest repayment period
scheduled for eleven years. Closer examination of these cases revealed
that debtors were not asking for the section 661 discharge; creditors were
neither objecting to missed payments nor filing motions to dismiss the
payment plans; and, as a result, no hearings were being held on the
modifications which resulted from missed payments. 43 The standing
trustee was holding the cases open as long as he was able to contact the
debtor and there was some prospect of future repayment. 44
In order to test whether the 1971 sample was unique and not representa-
tive of later experience in Buffalo wage earners' plans, samples were then
drawn from fiscal years 1973 and 1975. The later samples confirmed the
fact that the experience of the 1971 cases was typical for this geographical
area. The combination of debtors who wished to pay their debts, a judge
who was willing to let them try, and creditors who had less to lose by
waiting than by forcing the debtor out of the wage earners' proceeding,
produced cases which stayed open as long as any hope of payment
remained. 45 Termination of wage earners' plans was not affected either by
temporary unemployment or by Bankruptcy Act procedures.
Unemployment may have had an effect upon the amounts which debt-
ors proposed to repay. All of the debtors in the 1971 sample had proposed
100% payment of their debts. In fiscal 1973, there were a few exceptions
to this pattern, but by fiscal 1975 partial repayments were proposed by
more than one-third of the sample's debtors. 46
40 Bankruptcy Act, § 646(5), I1 U.S.C. § 1046(5) (1970) and RULE 13-214; Bankruptcy
Act, § 666, II U.S.C. § 1066 (1970) and RULE 13-215.
41 Bankruptcy Act, § 661, II U.S.C. § 1061 (1970) and RULE 13-404(b).
42 Not later than June 30, 1971.
43 See text accompanying notes 24-29 supra.
44 Some payments were even received from debtors who had long since moved out of the
state.
45 At this stage the creditors' cost would be limited to whatever personnel expense was
involved in monitoring an account which remained open to receive an occasional payment.
46 A wage earner's plan does not require full payment of scheduled debts, because a plan
can be confirmed at any repayment level which creditors will accept. The United States
Supreme Court has held that partial repayment plans have the same effect as a straight
bankruptcy discharge, however. A debtor who chooses partial repayment could be faced
with an objection to a later discharge if another petition were filed within six years. Perry v.
Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392 (1966); note 18 supra.
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Percent to be paid 1971 1973 1975
100% 100% 95.9% 64.3%
75% - - 2.4%
70% - 4.1% 2.4%
60% - - 2.4%
50% - - 23.8%
40% - - 2.4%
25% - - 2.4%
Debtors' attorneys reported that the increasing use of partial repay-
ments resulted from a combination of economic realities affecting the
debtors and lawyers' accumulated experience with wage earners' plans.
The attorneys described these debtors as people with very heavy debt
loads who attempted to ride out the inflationary recession with borrow-
ing. Although debtors often wished to pay 100%, their attorneys some-
times suggested paying less, because they believed that Judge McGuire
would not confirm a proposed plan which would run for more than three
to five years. Attorneys were initially hesitant to propose less than 100%
repayment, because the educational effort aimed at creditors had stressed
the potential for full repayment with wage earners' plans. Accumulated
experience revealed, however, that creditors would cooperate with par-
tial repayment plans, because "anything they get is better than noth-
ing . 47
A final review of all three samples occurred in June, 1976. Table I
shows their status as of that time.
TABLE I
Percentage of Sample Cases Completed, Dismissed, Adjudicated,
and Pending as of June, 1976, by Fiscal Years
1971 1973 1975
Successfully Completed 47.5% 26.5%a -
Dismissed 27.5% 20.5% I 1.9%b
Adjudicated 5.0% 10.2% 9.5%b
Pending 20.0% 42.8% 78.6%
a Includes 4 percent which were granted § 661 discharges and 4
percent which had proposed 70 percent plans.
b Includes 2.4 percent which were proposed as 50 percent plans.
Substantial percentages of the 1971 and 1973 samples remained pending,
although the 1971 cases could have been filed for as long as six years and
the 1973 cases for as long as four years.48 Cases in the 1975 sample had
been pending for as long as two years, and although some of these cases
had been dismissed or adjudicated into straight bankruptcy,4 9 none had as
yet been successfully completed. For each sample, Table II shows the
median time which elapsed before termination of the case.
11 Confidential interviews with lawyers who represent Chapter XIII petitioners in the
Buffalo Region of the Western District of New York (August 1976).
48 The earliest filings occurred in July 1970, and July 1972 respectively.
49 See notes 24-29 and accompanying text supra.
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TABLE II
Median Number of Months from Filing to Completion,
Dismissal, and Adjudication, as of June, 1976, by Fiscal Years
1971' 1973b  1975'
Successful completion 44 32 -
Low 26 11
High 53 41
Dismissal 38 32 8
Low 11 14 5
High 62 38 17
Adjudication 21 14 9
Low 20 5 8
High 23 35 11
aFiled for a maximum of 72 months in June, 1976.
bFiled for a maximum of 48 months in June, 1976.
cFiled for a maximum of 24 months in June, 1976.
When compared with the three-year period for eligibility for a section 661
discharge, maximum time periods exceeding four or five years suggest
substantial tolerance for delays in the debtors' attempted performance.
The existence of these delays was confirmed by observation of the trust-
ees' operations. The statute's requirements for formal hearings on any
modification of a confirmed plan50 were being ignored, apparently be-
cause creditors had nothing to gain by either dismissal or adjudication.
Instead of moving for prompt dismissal when defaults occurred, creditors
allowed cases to be held open as long as any prospect of payment
remained and relied on the trustees' judgment to decide when further
hope was fruitless.
The reasons supporting a trustee's judgment that a particular case had
no further potential were rarely explicit in the case files. The Buffalo
trustees make most of their contacts by telephone and detailed written
records of their conversations are not made. Ordinarily, if the debtor
cannot be contacted or if the trustee decides after discussing the situation
with the debtor that no more payments can be expected, he simply files a
motion to dismiss the proceeding, 51 citing insufficient payments.5 2 Cred-
itors have no reason to object unless they know of sources of income
which the debtor has failed to disclose to the trustee. No record of such
objections appeared in these files. Similarly, the files often do not reveal
the reasons for the decision to convert a wage earners' plan to a straight
bankruptcy proceeding. Explanations which were noted include belated
50 Bankruptcy Act, § 646(5), 11 U.S.C. § 1046(5) (1970) and RULE 13-214.
11 Bankruptcy Act, § 666, 11 U.S.C. § 1066 (1970) and RULE 13-215(a).
52 This description is based upon the author's observation of the Chapter XIII trustees'
behavior and subsequent discussions with them concerning their procedures.
FALL 1977]
Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 11:51
recognition of how difficult it would be to meet the obligations of the plan,
illness, and layoff or reduced income. 53
The extent of creditors' tolerance became even clearer when a com-
parison was made of the status of pending cases in both July 1975, and
June 1976. As of June 1976, the median projected completion time for
pending cases in fiscal 1971 was eighty-seven months; for fiscal 1973,
fifty-six months; and for fiscal 1975, forty-seven months.5 4 For individual
cases from the 1971 sample, the median slippage in projected completion
time between July 1975, and June 1976, was eight months.5 5 For example,
the median pending case had been projected as of July 1975, to close in
January 1983. By June of 1976, however, it was expected to remain open
until September 1983. Obviously, payments in the interim were erratic,
and the estimated payment period of twelve years between filing in 1971
and the projected completion in 1983 could be extended further. In the
1973 sample, the median slippage was two months, 56 and in the 1975
sample, there was a median gain of one month in projected completion.
For this latest sample, changes in completion dates were dramatic, rang-
ing from a gain of fifty months when scheduled creditors failed to file
claims to a loss of forty-five months when unscheduled creditors filed.
Since the files disclosed no evidence that creditors monitored these
cases after confirmation, it is unlikely that they were aware of such
dramatic changes in the likelihood of repayment. Instead they enjoyed the
benefits of a low-cost collection service, 57 often facilitated by direct,
53 Because of the availability of dismissal or adjudication and because a discharge in
straight bankruptcy affects only unsecured claims, wage earners' plans are open to abuse by
debtors whose goal is only to protect their interests in property subject to valid security
interests. A debtor who files a straight bankruptcy petition risks losing property which
served as collateral for validly secured creditors. Under a wage earner's plan, secured
creditors may be restrained from proceeding to recover their collateral if the bankruptcy
judge finds that their interests are protected and that such behavior would jeopardize the
plan. Bankruptcy Act, §§ 614, 652, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1014, 1052 (1970), RULES 13-401 and 13-212.
Under the wage earners' plans administered in Buffalo, secured creditors are paid in full
before unsecured creditors receive any payments. Debtors might therefore pay their secured
creditors in full and immediately either seek adjudication or allow dismissal to occur. The
three samples each included instances of full payment to secured creditors followed by
defaults in the plans. But the frequency of such occurrences was so low (12.5% in FY 1971;
12.2% in FY 1973; 2.4% in FY 1975) that it does not support a thesis of widespread
manipulation of the procedures.
54 The 1975 figure is obviously lower than it would have been if the earlier pattern of
confirming all plans for 100% payment had been continued. See note 46 and accompanying
text supra.
55 Ranging from a gain of two months to a loss of seventeen months.
5' Ranging from a gain of two months to a loss of fourteen months.
57 When these samples were examined for the last time in June 1976, the median amounts
paid to creditors in closed cases were consistent with the variations in the proposed plans.
1971 1973 1975
Successfully completed ................. $4250 $3250 -
Dism issed ............................. 1750 1250 $ 500
Adjudicated ............................ 2750 500 1000
For successfully completed cases in the 1971 sample, the median payments equalled the
median scheduled debts, a result which reflected the fact that confirmed plans in that year
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court-ordered payments of salary deductions by the debtor's employer.
Whether these results were intended by the original statutory drafters
may no longer be important. The proposed statutory revisions to the
Bankruptcy Act should be evaluated, however, to determine whether
they reflect this accumulated experience.
II. REFORM EFFORTS
A. The Bankruptcy Rules
The work of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the
Judicial Conference provided the first opportunity to incorporate experi-
ence with wage earners' plans into bankruptcy procedures. The Commit-
tee began the painstaking rule-drafting process after authorizing legisla-
tion was passed in 1964,5 s and the Chapter XIII Rules became effective
October 1, 1973. 59
Several factors combined to produce rules which had a minimal effect
upon the extent of judicial control over wage earners' plans. Since the
Bankruptcy Rules may affect only procedural matters, 60 it would have
been inappropriate for the Advisory Committee to undertake basic sub-
stantive reforms. Commentators have noted that the Chief Reporter,
Professor Frank Kennedy of the University of Michigan, was careful not
to overstep the jurisdictional limits of his task.6 1 Insofar as the proposed
rules affected wage earners' plans, this professional conservatism was
reinforced by two other important factors. First, the proposed rules
affecting straight bankruptcy proceedings had been previously issued for
comments, and the Chapter XIII Rules were closely correlated with the
consistently required 100% payment. For the 1973 sample, the median successfully com-
pleted case totalled only $3250, but almost one-third of these cases had either proposed 70%
plans or received § 661 discharges. In all three samples, the payments in dismissed and
adjudicated cases were small, as debtors failed to meet their obligations under confirmed
plans.
58 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970). The Committee was established in 1960 and initially gave
priority to a revision of the General Orders and official bankruptcy forms. Advisory Com-
mittee's Introductory Note to the Preliminary Draft to the Bankruptcy Rules, reprinted in
COLLIER PAMPHLET EDITION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT AND RULES 751 (1975).
59 BANKR. R. & OFFICIAL BANKR. FORMS, 415 U.S. 1003 (1973).
60 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1975). Reported litigation challenging the substantive nature of the
rules for Chapter XIII has thus far involved only RULE 13-307(d). That rule allows the court
to value the collateral in allegedly secured claims as of the date of the petition. United States
district courts have split on the nature of the rule. Compare In re Moralez, 400 F. Supp. 1352
(N.D. Cal. 1975) (holding it invalid) with In re Wall, 403 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Ark. 1975) and
In re McKee, 416 F. Supp. 652, (E.D. Ark. 1976) (sustaining its validity). Other cases have
considered the same issue indirectly. See In re Garcia, 396 F. Supp. 518 (C.D. Cal. 1974); In
re Cassidy, 401 F. Supp. 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). See also Countryman, Partially Secured
Creditors Under Chapter XIII, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 269 (1976).
61 Cyr, The Abandonment of the Judicial Administration of Insolvency Proceedings: A
Commitnent to Consumer Disservice, 78 CoM. L.J. 37, 38 (1973); Landers, Tie New
Bankruptcy Rules: Relics of the Past as Fixtures of the Future, 57 MINN. L. REV. 827, 835
(1973). Professor Kennedy later became Executive Director of the Commission on Bank-
ruptcy Laws of the United States. The Commission's jurisdiction did include substantive
matters. See note 8 supra.
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earlier provisions. 6 2 Second, none of the participants in the rule-drafting
process had substantial experience with the administration of wage ear-
ners' plans. Practicing professionals, particularly bankruptcy judges with
Chapter XIII experience, were consulted in an attempt to remedy this
deficiency. 63 It is suggested, however, that these sources were unlikely to
propose reforms reducing their own roles in the administration of wage
earners' plans.
The Advisory Committee did take some steps to remove judges from
the detailed administration of wage earners' plans6 4 and to reduce the
number of required hearings. 65 The Chapter XIII Rules also recognized
some of the distinctions between straight bankruptcy cases, which focus
on the liquidation of nonexempt assests, and wage earners' plans, which
rely upon payments from future income.
6 6
Despite the recognition of some differences, the basic setting for admin-
istration of wage earners' plans under the rules remained adversarial 6 7
and subsequent amendments have not affected the provisions which
mandate adversary procedures. 6s An adversary setting maximizes judicial
control, because it is based upon the theory that judicial decisions will be
necessary to resolve contested issues in these cases. A study of the
sample cases from Buffalo reveals that in practice creditors will waive
almost all their opportunities for participation. The basic creditors' rights
waived in the Buffalo cases were the right to contest modifications before
confirmation; 69 the right to participate in a confirmation hearing; 70 the
62 Preliminary Draft on Proposed Bankruptcy Rules and Official Forms under Chapter
XIII of the Bankruptcy Act, xvi, xviii (September 1971). The Associate Reporter of the ch.
XIII rules was Professor Vern Countryman of Harvard University.
63 Countryman, New Rules for Chapter XIII, 46 AM. BANKR. L.J. 129, 130 (1972).
64 E.g., RULE 13-202(a), which provides that a creditor who does not object to the
proposed plan is deemed to have accepted it; RULE 13-307(b), which provides that unse-
cured claims which are proved be deemed allowed unless an objection is made; and RULE
13-603(b), a provision which has the effect of eliminating the requirement that the judge
countersign dividend checks.
65 RULE 13-204(a) allows confirmation of the proposed payment plan at the first meeting of
creditors.
66 The emphasis on payments from income is reflected in RULE 13-111, which authorizes
spouses to file a joint petition and to have joint administration; RULE 13-403, which relieves
the trustee of the necessity of setting aside exemptions in these cases, requiring only that the
debtor claim his exemptions in the event that a straight bankruptcy conversion follows; and
RULE 13-402(3), which relieves the trustees of the need to file a statement of executory
contracts in every case, retaining the requirement only that the debtor file such a statement
when required to do so by the court.
67 RULE 13-701.
68 Amendments effective on August 1, 1976, affected other significant interests. See RULE
13-302, a provision requiring that allegedly secured creditors file their proofs of claim before
the conclusion of the first meeting of creditors, so that confirmation and distribution to all
creditors could proceed without delay; RULE 13-304, a provision allowing co-debtors to file a
proof of claim on behalf of their creditors, thereby permitting distribution to the creditor and
providing an incentive to delay collection from the co-debtor; and RULE 13-305, a provision
which allows creditors to add claims which were incurred after the debtor filed the wage
earners' proceeding if they were for taxes or for "property or services needed to assure
proper performance under the plan."
69 RULE 13-212.
10 RULE 13-213.
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right to object to modifications after confirmation; 71 the right to object to
dismissals or conversion to straight bankruptcy proceedings; 72 and the
right to object to a discharge for failure to complete the payments of the
plan.
73
The combination of such waivers in actual cases provides a striking
divergence from the statutory theory of creditor control and monitoring of
wage earners' plans in an adversary context. The rules failed to reflect
this experience, but a second opportunity to utilize it arose during revi-
sion of the bankruptcy legislation.
B. Legislative Developments
The Chapter XIII Rules became effective contemporaneously with the
introduction of legislation resulting from the report of the Presidential
Commission on bankruptcy laws.7 4 In the Commission Bill, the proce-
dures for wage earners' plans appeared in Chapter VI, which provided
plans for "debtors with regular income." ' 75 The Judges' Bill contained a
similar proposal, 76 which also reflected a decision to conform the Chapter
to the procedures required under the rules. 77 The existence of the Chapter
XIII Rules had a restrictive effect on the reform proposals which the
judges were willing to consider, just as the existence of the straight
bankruptcy rules restricted the work of those who drafted the Chapter
XIII Rules. 78 These limitations were reinforced by the professional con-
servatism of those who had a continuing impact on the developing legisla-
tion.7 9
Late in the congressional hearings process, the National Bankruptcy
Conference presented its proposed revisions of the pending bills to the
House and Senate Judiciary Subcommittees. 80 Subsequently, committees
representing the Judges and the Conference were established to work out
their continuing differences of opinion. The resulting reports were for-
warded informally to the House and Senate committees so that their staffs
could have the benefit of the outcome of the negotiating process while
71 RULE 13-214.
72 RULE 13-215.
73 RULE 13-404.
74 See note 8 supra.
75 The proposed Chapter VI coverage was broader than that presently authorized under
Chapter XIlI, which is limited to a petitioner "whose principal income is derived from
wages, salary or commissions." Bankruptcy Act, § 606(8), II U.S.C. § 1006(8) (1970).
76 H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 6-101 to 6-701 (1975).
77 Synopsis of the bankruptcy legislation prepared by the National Conference of Bank-
ruptcy Judges, mimeo, undated, p. 14.
78 See text accompanying note 62, supra. Professor Landers had earlier predicted that
those who drafted legislation might be reluctant to make the work of the Rules Committee
superfluous. Landers, supra note 61, at 25.
79 By this time, the Commission had completed its work and gone out of existence. The
primary groups remaining were the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges and the
National Bankruptcy Conference, whose members are present and former bankruptcy
judges, law professors, and prominent bankruptcy practitioners.
80 The Bankruptcy Act of 1975, reprinted in Bankruptcy Act Revision, Appendix, supra
note 3, at 333-91.
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working on legislative revisions.8 ' If the legislation 82 ultimately enacted
as part of the overall bankruptcy law revisions incorporates the results of
these reports, confirmed plans for debtors with regular income could be
administered much as they have been in the past.
Initially, commentators and witnesses testifying at the hearings gave
comparatively little attention to the specific legislative proposals for hand-
ling the present wage earners' plans in the Commission Bill and the
Judges' Bill. 83 Two preliminary issues relating to lawyers' and judges'
status and affecting all bankruptcy petitioners did draw considerable
attention: first, the degree of assistance which petitioners would receive
from the bankruptcy system in choosing between the alternative remedies
of straight bankruptcy and plans for debtors with regular income; and,
secondly, the proper location for filing all bankruptcy petitions.
The issue of how to provide petitioners with help in choosing among
nonbusiness bankruptcy alternatives threatened both the view that pri-
vate debtors' counsel were essential and the possibility that judges' pref-
erences would affect that choice. The Commission Bill provided that
bankruptcy petitions would be filed without making a choice between
alternatives. Once having filed, the debtor would be advised about the
existence of alternatives by agency staff.8 4 This recommendation resulted
from the Commission's finding that the preference of judges and debtors'
counsel played a significant role in the very uneven use of wage earners'
plans throughout the country.8 5
The Commission's proposal caused concern about whether personnel
in the agency with responsibility for ultimately administering the case
should also be providing advice about options.8 6 It was also argued that
the agency might develop a bias in favor of either of the two alternatives,
even if the problems concerning confidentiality and conflict of interest
could be resolved. 87 These concerns were reflected in the Judges' Bill,
which limited assistance by administrative staff to the preparation of the
petition and the schedules which reflect indebtedness.8 8 By eliminating
agency staff, H.R. 8200 leaves advice about statutory options exclusively
to the private bar.
81 Letter to the Conferees from Charles A. Horsky, Chairman of the National Bankruptcy
Conference (June 24, 1976).
82 See H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
83 These procedures appeared as Chapter VI of the earlier legislative proposals, but they
appear as Chapter 13 in H.R. 8200. See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
84 H.R. 31 and S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-203 (1975).
85 COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT, Part I,
157-60 (1973), which confirmed data in D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 7, at 74-76.
Testimony of Professor Frank Kennedy, Executive Director of the Commission, Bank-
ruptcy Act Revision, Part 1, supra note 3, at 167-68; The Bankruptcy Reform Act, Part I,
supra, note 4, at 23.
86 Some witnesses before the congressional committees testified that an agency system
could be structured to segregate responsibilities and to protect petitioners from the possibil-
ity of inappropriate disclosure of information concerning discussions of options. Bankruptcy
Act Revision, Part I, supra note 3, at 182-83, 367-68, 542, and 588. Others felt that adequate
protection for petitioners would be impossible. Id. at 609-10, 905-06, and 953.
87 Id. at 571-72, 948-49, and 953.
88 H.R. 32 and S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-203 (1975).
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A provision that bankruptcy petitions be filed with an administrative
agency8" would have reduced the importance of the judicial role from the
outset of the bankruptcy proceeding.90 This threat to judicial status has
also been eliminated by H.R. 8200, which retains a judicially controlled
setting for bankruptcy cases.91 The implications of that basic decision are
evident in the treatment in H.R. 8200 of the procedural steps which were
crucial to the administration of wage earners' plans in the Buffalo sam-
ples. H.R. 8200 assigns the highest priority to the maintenance of judicial
control, although the legislation does recognize some of the economic
realities which creditors face. For example, at the time a payment plan is
confirmed, judicial control is maintained by requiring a hearing for con-
firmation.9 2 One of the conditions for confirmation, however, is a judicial
finding that unsecured creditors will not receive less than a straight
bankruptcy liquidation would have produced. 93 Recognizing that unse-
cured creditors have less to lose if such payments are possible,94 the
statute does not require them to file formal acceptances to these plans.
In contrast, for modifications after confirmation, which were most
crucial to the effective conclusion of plans in the Buffalo samples, H.R.
8200 ignores the economic realities for creditors while maintaining for-
malities which are consistent with continued judicial control. The data in
the Buffalo samples indicate that debtors in wage earners' plans often
need postconfirmation modifications because of layoffs, illness, or other
unforeseen circumstances.9 5 When these requests are made, the statute
allows the trustee to proceed only "after notice and a hearing, ' 96 a
procedure which appears to involve the judge in each modification; how-
ever, the statute limits these requirements to appropriate notice and an
1a Both the Commission bill and the National Bankruptcy Conference version of the
legislation recommended this approach; the Judges' Bill retained filing with a court. The
provision is § 4-202(b) in all versions.
" See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act Revision, Part 1, supra note 3, at 533-34 and 628-29.
Testimony at the congressional hearings focused indirectly on this status issue, with oppo-
nents of the agency alleging that filing with an agency would encourage debtors to resort to
bankruptcy. Id. at 20, 570-71, 906, 1018-19, and 1045.
91 See notes 10-12 and accompanying text supra.
92 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 1324 (1977). The Commission bill would have
authorized the administrator to confirm a plan, allowing objectors to appeal to a court. H.R.
31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 6-204 (1975). The Judges' Bill required a judicial hearing for
confirmation. H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6-306 (1975). A similar provision in the
National Bankruptcy Conference proposal was described by their spokesman as "another
concession which the National Bankruptcy Conference made to the judges." Testimony of
George M. Treister, Vice Chairman, National Bankruptcy Conference, before the House
Judiciary Subcommittee, Bankruptcy Act Revision, Part I, supra note 3, at 595.
" H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1325(a)(4) (1977). Debtors have the right to modify
their proposals before confirmation. H.R. 8200, § 1323.
"4 Earlier research revealed that successful wage earners' plans yield 90% payment to
unsecured creditors and that even cases ultimately dismissed yield 19%. D. STANLEY & M.
GIRTH, supra note 7, at 102. By contrast, straight bankruptcy is a very bleak alternative,
with payments to unsecured creditors occurring in less than 15% of the cases and amounting
to only seven cents on the dollar. Id., at 92-93.
" See notes 44-51 and accompanying text supra.
96 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 1329(a) (1977). The Judges' Bill had more closely
reflected the economic reality for creditors by allowing modifications without notice unless
the modification converted an extension plan to a composition which would pay creditors
less than 100%. H.R. 32, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. § 6-307 (1975).
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opportunity for a hearing.9 7 If individual notice is sent to each creditor for
every modification, the practice under H.R. 8200 will be much different
and more costly than the practice used in the Buffalo cases. Moreover, if
such notices are sent and no creditors request hearings, the additional
costs will not be offset by any perceptible benefit to creditors. On the
other hand, without such notices the opportunity for a hearing becomes
meaningless, unless the notice requirement is creatively interpreted. For
example, the confirmation order might provide that a reduced check or
missed payment constitutes notice of a modification which would entitle
the creditor to request a hearing. Alternatively, creditors might be asked
to waive their rights to notice as long as the modified plan did not exceed
the maximum time period allowed under the statute. 98
When a debtor seeks a discharge after a payment plan has been con-
firmed, creditors might have slightly more incentive to request a hearing,
because an inappropriately granted discharge could deprive them of pos-
sible payments. The statutory procedures, which again allow judges to
maintain control by granting a discharge after notice and a hearing, 99 are
more consistent with creditors' economic interests in these cases than
they are when continued payments are possible. Creditors' participation
is not essential, however, because the judge cannot discharge the debtor
without assessing the comparative value of payments to unsecured cred-
itors if straight bankruptcy had been chosen.100
III. IMPLICATIONS OF MAXIMIZING JUDICIAL CONTROL
To date, the bankruptcy reform process has placed higher priority on
maintaining judicial control than on reflecting the economic interests of
creditors who are receiving payments from consumer debtors in a court-
administered plan. Future bankruptcy judges will administer payment
plans for debtors with regular income under the proposed Bankruptcy Act
in ways which greatly resemble the current wage earners' plans, and the
amount of creditor repayments will not be affected significantly. Debtors
will contine to pay as much as their vulnerable circumstances permit if
they wish to have consumer credit available for future use. Creditors will
continue to waive their opportunities to participate, because participation
97 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(l) (1977).
98 See notes 102-103 and accompanying text infra.
99 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1382(b) (1977). By requiring only an opportunity fora
hearing in § 102(1), this legislation is closer to the Commission Bill, H.R. 31, 94th Cong., Ist
Sess. § 6-207(2) (1975), than to the Judges' Bill, H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6-501(2)
(1975), which required a hearing in each instance.
100 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1328(b)(2) (1977). A debtor can also convert
proceedings to straight bankruptcy at any time. § 1307(a). The court may also convert the
case or dismiss it without a hearing, upon a finding that such a decision is in the best
interests of creditors. § 1307(c) and (e). A dismissal would leave the debtor subject to
creditors' collection efforts, and a conversion would allow creditors to participate in straight
bankruptcy proceedings. Unless the debtors' nonexempt assets are substantial, either con-
version or dismissal will mean no further payments to unsecured creditors. H.R. 8200
provides specific exemptions and allows the debtor to choose between those specified and
those available under other state, federal, or local laws. 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 522(b) (1977).
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usually only increases their costs without increasing their receipts. Judges
may even dispense with required formalities when creditors systemati-
cally fail to participate in the proceedings.
One possible exception to this pattern may occur if the notice require-
ments for postconfirmation modifications are strictly construed., 0 ' More
stringent and explicit time limits for such plans might also significantly
restrict the practice reflected in the Buffalo samples of allowing cases to
remain open as long as any hope of further payment remains. 02 The
statute suggests a three-year period for payments pursuant to a confirmed
plan, although it allows a judge to extend that period to five years for
cause. 0 3 Such a provision protects debtors against excessively burden-
some plans and the taxpaying public against excessive use of the federal
courts for protracted collection cases.
Experience with the Buffalo cases indicates that the five-year
maximum may not appear difficult to meet at the time of confirmation.
Debtors sometimes underestimate their obligations when they file such
proceedings. ' 04 In addition, H.R. 8200 allows a debtor to obtain a straight
bankruptcy discharge after completion of a plan paying less than 100% to
creditors. 10 5 If debtors are willing to propose less than full payment, 10 6
the five-year maximum will obviously be even easier to meet at confirma-
tion.
However, the five-year maximum also applies to postconfirmation
modifications. 0 7 Experience in the Buffalo cases reveals that many plans
will have to be repeatedly revised, but that payments will be successfully
completed within a five-year period.' 08 Judges are therefore likely to
devise varying methods of minimizing the costs of formally testing each
modification against the statutory maximum. One possibility would be to
include in the confirmation order a provision that the confirmed plan will
be terminated not later than five years after performance begins. Under
such a procedure, debtors who wish to continue to make payments
thereafter will have to do so without the assistance of the court's staff.
Alternatively, the confirmation order might provide that the five-year
maximum will be deemed waived until the debtor or trustee seeks a
discharge, dismissal, or conversion to straight bankruptcy. 00
If only minor changes occur in the administration of payment plans for
debtors with regular income, the costs of such a legislative process may
be calculated more in terms of opportunities missed rather than in results
101 See notes 96-98 and accompanying text supra.
102 See notes 49-51 and accompanying text supra.
103 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1322(c) (1977). If additional payments are possible,
it is unlikely that creditors will oppose a finding that inability to complete the payments
within three years constitutes cause.
I04 See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
105 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 727(a)(8) (1977).
10' See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
107 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1329(c) (1977).
10' The longest successfully completed case took 53 months. See Table II supra.
09 If a primary goal of the maximum time limit is to protect the taxpaying public, such a
provision.would be inappropriate.
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achieved. Legislation affecting nonbusiness bankrupts could have been
directed toward an alternative goal: successful family functioning in a
credit-oriented society, with emphasis upon financial and family counsel-
ing. Such a goal would have required more than devising a structure
which maximizes the control ofjudges and lawyers and the consistency of
their customary formalities.
Early in the bankruptcy law revision process, commentators recom-
mended that financial counseling be available as a service to bankrupts, 110
but systematic financial counseling was not included in any of the legisla-
tive proposals. H.R. 8200 does authorize the Chapter 13 trustee"' to
"advise, other than on legal matters and assist the debtor in performance
under the plan."" ' 2 Although it is impossible to estimate how extensive
such advice will be in individual cases, the magnitude of the trustees'
caseloads suggests that counseling is more likely to involve necessary
modifications of payment schedules in pending proceedings than financial
counseling aimed at future performance without court assistance.
The failure of the bankruptcy reform proposals to include staff for
financial counseling is consistent with a tradition of failure to deal with
family financial functioning once civil cases have reached formal court
proceedings. " 3 Such staffing should nonetheless remain under considera-
tion for possible future statutory amendments." 4 With nonbusiness bank-
ruptcy petitions totalling nearly 200,000 per year in recent years," 15 the
number of families operating under severe financial stress is substan-
tial.' 1 6
110 Henmann, Families in Bankruptcy-A Survey of Recent Studies, 28 J. MARR. & FAM.
324, 330 (1966); D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 7, at 205.
Ill The Chapter 13 trustee can be elected by creditors or appointed by the United States
trustee as the standing trustee for all Chapter 13 cases in the district. If neither method is
used, the salaried United States trustee serves as the Chapter 13 trustee in addition to his
duties in other bankruptcy cases. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1302(a) (1977).
112 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1302(c) (1977). However, this responsibility is not
imposed upon creditor-elected trustees.
113 The counseling services have been analogized to those traditionally expected of
probation staff in federal criminal proceedings. Siporin, Bankrupt Debtors and Their
Families, 12 Soc. WORK 51, 62 (1967).
114 It is more understandable that financial counseling was not provided when wage
earners' plans were first included as part of the bankruptcy revisions of 1938. Consumer
credit was not widely available or utilized until World War II ended seven years later. An
expanded definition of needs accompanied the possiblity of discretionary spending beyond
subsistence levels. G. KATONA, THE MASS CONSUMPTION SOCIETY 6, 231 (1964). As a
result, between 1945 and 1965 the consumer debt burden climbed to approximately one-fifth
of disposable personal income before levelling off for the nine years ending in December
1974. See Yeager, Personal Bankruptcy and Economic Stability, 41 S. ECON. J. 96, 100
(1974). Prof. Yeager defined the consumer debt burden as the proportion of consumer credit
outstanding to disposable personal income. His calculations were updated by the author.
" See TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, supra note 14, at Table F3, for the respec-
tive fiscal years.
116 Such stress may be especially intense for the working-class families who are predo-
minant among the petitioners for wage earners' plans, because they are vulnerable to income
fluctuations resulting from cutbacks in overtime or layoffs. Schneiderman, The Practical
and Cultural Significance of Money, 23 PUB. WELFARE 197, 198 (1965); Hurvitz, Marital
Strain in the Blue Collar Family, in A. SHOSTAK & W. GOMBERG, BLUE COLLAR WORLD 93,
101 (1964).
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The impact of financial stress on family functioning is pervasive. 1 17 For
this reason, some bankruptcy judges have undertaken experiments with
more extensive family counseling and referrals. They report that it is
possible to make existing social services available to nonbusiness peti-
tioners in a bankruptcy setting." 8 By allowing status politics and appeals
for procedural consistency to predominate in the current bankruptcy
revisions, we have missed the opportunity to systematize the availability
of counseling and to reduce societal costs over the longer term.
Such costs are diffuse and hard to estimate, and it is difficult to per-
suade Congress to accept staffing to facilitate cost-prevention in a bank-
ruptcy context. If bankruptcy judges are willing to continue to improvise
such programs, however, a later proposal to add staff to provide financial
counseling and to coordinate referrals to available social services may be
successful.
117 Money management problems emerge as a significant cause of interspousal hostility,
alienation, or avoidance. Krupinski, Marshall, & Yule, Patterns of Marital Problems in
Marriage Guidance Clinics, 32 J. MARR. & FAM. 138-42 (1970). Wives, who typically
controlled expenditures in blue-collar families, reported absolute discontent with their finan-
cial status. L. RAINWATER, R. COLEMAN & G. HANDEL, WORKINGMAN'S WIFE 82, 145
(1959). These families often engage in compensatory consumption as a substitute for blocked
social mobility. Caplovitz, The Problems of Blue Collar Consumers, in A. SHOSTAK & W.
GOMBERG, supra note 116, at 110.
Ill These data were also ignored by the legislators who were revising the statute. Ander-
son, A Digest of Broader Persectivesfor Bankruptcy Court Reform, 81 CoM. L. J. 240, 241
(1976); Cyr, Setting the Record Straight for a Comprehensive Revision of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, 49 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 155-56 (1975).
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